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Justice:

The SG has filed a Supplemental Memorandum. It points out that the Eighth Circuit has just decided a similar case in
which it recognized that the Ninth Circ ui t's
Wheeler decision was directly on point, but
refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's holding.
The Eighth Circuit case is called United
States v. Walkiny Crow. The Eighth Circuit
declared that fo lowing the Wheeler case
"might mean that the felony jurisdiction
conferred on the federal courts • • • could
in instances be frustrated by relatively minor
prosecutions in tribal courts. Such a situation _. would be undesirable and might lead
to still further congressional enc~hment
on the jurisdiction of those courts.'
The fact that there is now a clear
conflict supports your inclination to grant.
Bob

I

••

...

whether the Fifth Amendment precludes trial for rape in federal
district court following conviction for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor and "disor?e+lY conduct under Navajo tribal
law.
2.

FACTS:

Defendant respondent is a Navajo.

-

He pled

guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor and disorderly
conduct before a Navajo tribal court.

Over a year later, he

was convicted in a federal district court for statutory rape.
The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.

§

1153, 2032 (1970) makes it

/~~ (-L.._~/-'?)

~

a federal offense (with jurisdiction in the federal district
court) to commitonanfudian reservation any of a specified list
of crimes.

Both charges arose out of the same occurrence.

The

Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction on the grounds of double
jeopardy.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The Solicitor General petitions for

certiorari on two alternate grounds.

First, he argues that there

is no double jeopardy where the offenses were separate crimes
against two separate sovereigns.

The Ninth Circuit opinion

relies on the Tenth Amendment for the proposition that a power
not explicitly given to the federal government is reserved to
the states.

Hence, all power is to be found in either the states

or the federal government.

Since Indian tribes are not subject

to the control of state governments, the Ninth Circuit ccncluded
that they must exercise a form of federal jurisdiction.
sovereig~

the same

in involved.

Hence,

The Solicitor contends that

Indian tribes constitute a third type of sovereign recognized
by the Constitution.

Secondly, the Solicitor argues that, even if Indian tribes
are held to exercise jurisdiction of a federal nature, the two
crimes of which respondent was convicted constitute separate
offenses.
4.

DISCUSSION:
A.

Sovereignty.

1.

Jeopardy does not apply to different sovereigns.
In 1847, the Supreme Court in Fox v. Ohio, 5 How.

410, first recognized an exception to the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy where the two crimes were offenses against

different sovereigns.

(

The same principle has continually been

reaffirmed

59 U.S. 187 (1959), approved concourt for crimes stemming from the

identical set of facts, because "two sovereignties, deriving
power from different sources" had been offended, citing U.S. v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).

This Court has addressed the

question of what is necessary to constitute an independent
sovereign i n-W5l ler v. Fla., 397 U.S. 387 (1970), where sequential
prosecutions in municipal and state court were ·held to violate the
double jeopardy provision.

Double jeopardy was involved because

"the judicial power to try petitioner on the first charges in
municipal court springs from the same organic law that created the
state court of general jurisdiction in which petitioner was
tried and convicted for a felony."
Waller relied heavily on Grafton v. U.S., 206

(1907).

!~he

u.s.

334

courts martial and the territorial court

of the Philipp1nes were held to be courts of the same sovereignty
for double jeopardy purposes.

"[T]he two tribunals that tried

the accused exert all their powers under and by authority of the
same government--tha-e of the United States." "The Government of
a State does not derive its powers from the United States, while
the Government of the Philippines owes its existence wholly
to the United States, and its judicial tribunals exert all their
powers by authority of the United States.

The jurisdiction and

authority of the United States over that territory and its inhabitants ,
for all legitimate purposes of government, is paramount."
U.S. at 334-335.

206

-

Tqe test thus appears to be whether the jurisdictions

.··,·

involved originally derived their authority from the same government.
Territorial courts, military courts, district courts, and
for the commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico v. Shell co.,
302 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1937)) have all been held to find their
source of authority in the federal government.

Only state

governments, and the authority exercised by municipalities created
by the states, have been found not to derive their authority
from the federal government.
Indian tribunals must be fitted within this scheme.
There is no serious question that the authority of Indian tribunals
is not a creature of state law.

Either Indian jurisdiction is

granted by federal authority, or Indian tribes constitute a

respons~

to the case of Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).

In that case, this Court held that federal jurisdiction did
not extend to murder of one Indian by another on a reservation.
The Indian tribes were seen to start out with plenary authority.
The fact that the Congress could specify certain crimes to
.be removed from the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal courts does
not deny the "residual sovereignty" of the tribe.
In holding that the states could not exert jurisdiction
over civil suits by non-Indians against Indians concerning
business on the reservation, this Court emphasized the aboriginal
authority of the Indian tribes over their own affairs.
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).

Williams

1

'There can be no doubt that to

allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine
the authority of the tribal courts over reservation affairs

-

~

and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves."

358 U.S. 223.

Neverthelesa, even when citing

Worcester v. Ga., 6 Pet. 515 (1832), the Court's opinion recognizes the p e rvasive authority of the federal g o y ernmen t
Indian affairs.

QYO~

"The whole intercourse between the United States

and this [Cherokee] nation, is, by our constitution and laws,
vested in the government of the United States." 6 Pet. at 561,
cited at 358 U.S. at 218-19.
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), dealt e x plicitly
with whethe r the existence of federal authority was incompatible
with residual sovereignty in Indian tribes.

"True it is that in

many adjudications of this Court the fact has been fully recognized, that although possessed of these attributes of local
self government, when exercising their tribal functions, all
such rights are subject to the supreme legislative authority of
the United States . . . . But the existence of the right in Congress
to regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee
Nation shall be exercised does not render such local powers
Federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of
the United States."
To the extent that there has been federal regulation of
crimes on reservations, it has not been through a comprehensive
code, but rather by express exceptions to what is conceded
otherwise to be, and always to have been, within tribal jurisdiction.

That is the viewpoint taken by another panel of the Ninth

Circuit in Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (1976), a
case denying habeas relief to a non-Indian . taken into custody
by tribal police:

"The proper approach to the question of tribal

criminal jurisdiction is to ask 'first, what the original

POST-ARGUMENT MEMO
TO:
FROM:

Mr. Justice Powell
Jan. 12, 1978

Nancy
RE:

United States v. Wheeler

The argument in this case shifted my thinking
significantly and makes me incline in favor of reversal,
i.e., a holding that Indian tribes are a separate sovereign
for double jeopardy purposes .

This result, however, would

depend on the opinion in Oliphant not being written to
say that tribes do not have inherent sovereignty.

To be

consistent with a reversal in Wheeler, the opinion in
Oliphant would have to say that although tribes had inherent
sovereignty (and still do, with respect to intra-Indian
matters), § 1152 withdraws from the tribes jurisdiction over
non-Indians in criminal matters.

(And, of course, if Oliphant

comes out saying that the tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indians, there would be no conflict at all
a reversal in
with/Wheeler.)
Although I am not comfortable with the prospect of
denominating Indian tribes separate sovereignties (especially
such tribes as

th~

Suquamish), JPS' comments and questions at

2.

argument convinced me that the Court would have to overrule
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), to decide in favor
of resp in Wheeler,

Talton held that the grand jury provision

---

of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to trials of Indians
•

o(

....

for intra-Indian crimes by tribes. The Court's reasoning
-------.......
..
~ does not
is explicit: the Cherokee nation/derives its powers from
the federal government, and the plenary nature of Congress'
control does not make a difference for purposes of applying
the Fifth Amendment to the tribe.

xxxkiRkxxke (I've attached

the relevant part of the opinion.)

I think the SG is right,

too, in saying that Congress' enactment of the Indian Civil
Rights Act in 1968 (which conferred some constitutional
rights applicable in tribal trials) confirms the validity
of Talton, or at least shows that Congress thought Talton was
still good law.
It has been suggested that Talton should not apply
today because tribes and the nature of federal control kax have
changed significantly.

But I would not want to substitute

a modern-day assessment of tribal sovereignty for the
assessment of a Court that kax was closer to the time when
tribes truly were sovereign.
It has also been suggested that the relevance of Talton
today is limited by the fact that states were not subject
to the Fifth Amendment(through the Fourteenth) at the time
Talton was decided.

The Court might have thought it strange

to apply constitutional requirements in the first eight
amendments to Indian tribes, but not to states.

Although this

3.
might have occurred to the Talton Court, I do not think
it affected the analysis of the decision that much.

If

Indian tribes were considered instrumentalities of the
federal government, then constitutional provisions would
apply to the tribes even under Barron v. Baltimore, without
regard to the situation with the states.

Of course the

Court might have been struck by the apparent anomaly of
holding tribes but not states to constitutional strictures,
but the Court's explicit discussion centered on the fact
that tribes are separate sovereigns and not part of the
federal government.
I think it would be safe to reverse, unless the Court
does want to consider overruling--or going around--Talton.
Nancy

....
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Opinio n of the Court.
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adoption, shall be th e ouly parties, or wheru the c:cnse of action sba1l arise in th e Cherokee nation , exc-ept ~~s ut Lc:·wise
proYided in this treaty."
·
So, also, in" An act to proYid.e a t emporary gon:rnment for
the Territory of Oklalwma, to enlarge the j urisd ict ion of the
United States court in the Indian Tcni tor:' , and Jor other
purposes," approved :May 2, 1 SDO, c. 182, 26 Stat. 81, it was
provided, in section 30, as follows:
"That the judicial tribun als of the Indian n ati ons shall retain exclusiYe jurisdiction in all ci\•il and criminal cases arisi ng
in the countl'J in which members of the nation Ly nati Yi ty or
by adoption shall be tbe only parties; and :-ts to all such c:-tses
the 1:1ws of the State of Arkansas extended o\·er an d pn t in
force in said Indian Territory by this act shall not apply."
And section 31 of the last mentioned act closes with the
following paragraph:
"The Constitution of tbe United States and all gen eralla1Ys
of the United States which prohibit crimes and misdemeanors
in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States except in the District of Columbia, and aU laws
relating to national banking associations, shall La,vc the same
force and effect in the Indian Territory as elsewlwro in the
United States; but nothing in this act shall be so construed
as to dep1·ive any of the eonrts of the civilized nations of exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising \\·herein members of
~aid nations, 11hether by treaty, blood or adoption, are the
sole parties, nor so as to interfere with the l'ight and powers
of said civilized nations to punish said members for violation
of the statutes and laws enacted by their national councils
where such laws are not contrary to the treaties and laws of
the United States."
The crime of murder committed b · one Cherokee Inc\ ian
u )011 t 1e )erson of another within the ·nriscliction of the
Cherokee nation is, there ore, cl eal'ly not an offence against
tbe United States, but an offence against the local laws of
the Cherokee nation. Necessa,rily, the stc1tutes of the United
S tates \Yhich provide for an indictment l.Jy a grand jury, and
the n nmber of persons who shall constitute such a body, have

:'\'·~

,·

...

3S2

OCTOBEU TER)f, 1895.
Opiu iou of the Court.

n o P-pJ•l icatk•n, for such st:ttutcs relate only, if not otl.wl"i\ise
specially prov icic<l, to grnnd juries empanelled for tb e coul'ls
• . of and under the laiYS of the United States.
- - ~-~~"" '
The question, th erefore, is, does the Fifth Amendment to
tl1e Co nstitution apply to tho locallCgislation of the Cherokee
nation so as to require all prosecutions for offences committed
again sttb e laws of that nation to be initiated by a grand jury
organized in accordance >~ith the provisions of that amendment. The solution of this question involves an inquiry as
•
"
'•
to the nature and origin of the power of local government
exercised by the Ch erokee nation and recognized to exist in
it by the treaties and statutes a,bo\e referred to. Since the
case of B anon v. Balti71W1'e, 7 Pet. 24:3, it has been settled
th:tt the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States is a limitation only upon the powers of the General
Government, that is, that the amendment operates solely on
the Constitution itself by qualifying the powers of the Na·"
tional Go,ernment which the Constitution called into being.
To quote the language of Chief Justice J\Iarsball, this amendment is limitative of the "po·wers granted in the instrument
itself and not of distinct governments framed by different
persons and for different purposes. If these propositions be
correct, the Fifth Amendment must -be understood as restraining tbe lJOII·er of the Ge1'leral Government, riot as applicable to
~?!
the States." The cases in this court which have sanctioned
this view are too well recognized to render it necessary to
~~~
do more tlJan merely refer to them. Fox v. OMo, 5 How.
..
410, 424; ll""itll ers Y. Buckley, 20 How. 84; Twitchell -v. The
;,
'
'
Oommomcea.lth, 7 Wall. 321; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532,
l
557; Pecmson v. Yewdall, 05 U. S. 294, 296 ; Davis v. Texas,
'
139 U . S. G51.
The case in tbis regard therefore depends upon whether the
74 .....
powers of local government exercised by the Cherokee nation
are Federal powers created by and springing from the Constir'
'tt.\·
tution of the United States, and hence controlled by the Fifth
Am endment to that Constitution, or whether they are local
•:
powers not created by the Constitution, although subject to
its general provisions and the paramount authority of Con-

.

-

•.
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grcss. The 1·epe:1tcd n.d jud ications of this comt have long
since answered t1e f 'rm cr qu estion in the negative. In
Cherokee Nation Y. Gv . rgia, 5 Pet.. 1, which inYol1ed the right
of the Cherokee nation to maintain an original bill in this
court as a foreign St~1te, which n-as ruled ad\ersely to that
right, speaking through :Mr. Cl1ief Justice Marshall, this court
&'tid (p. 16) :
"Is the Ch erokee nation a foreign State in the sense in
1\-hich that term is used in the Constitution 1
"The connsel for the plaintiifs ha,ve maintained the affirmati\·e of this proposition with great earnestness and ability.
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the cba,racter of the Cherokees as a State, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its ow n
affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority
of the judges, been completely successful. They have been
uniformly trea,tecl as a State from t!Je settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made \Yith them by the United
States recognize them as a people capable of. maintaining the
relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for any '' io1ation of their ·engagements or fo r
any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States
uy any indiYidnal of their community. La.ws ba,ve been enacted in the spirit of these tr-eaties. The acts of our governdent plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a State, and
the courts are uouncl by those acts."
It cannot be dou uted, as said in Wm·cester v. The State of
Ge01·gia, 6 Pet. 515, 5J9, that prior to the formation of the
Constitution treaties \Yere made with the Cherokee tribes by
1\-bich their autonomous existence ,,-as recognized. And in
that case Chief J usticc }\farshall also said (p. 559) :
"The Indian nations had al,yays been considered as distinct,
ind epend ent political commnnities, retaining their original natural rights.
T1e very term 'nation,' so generally applied to them, means a 'people distinct from others.' The
Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as
those to be made, to be the supreme law of the hnd, has
adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties \Yith the Ind-

,.
l'

Opinion of H1e Court.

12.u D.:~ : :_ 1s, ::end CCJP:;cquently aJmits their ra.nk among t hose
pu\rers -.-.-Lo ~.1·e cap,,ble of m aking ii'eaties."
In re-:.-}e,rin ;;· tl1e w hole sul1jcct inl{ttgama v. Uni ted S tates,
118 U. S_ 3 75, this court said (p. 3S1) :
" W ith t he Indi ans th emselves these relations are eqnally
d ifiicult to d efi ne. They were, and always have -been, reg anlcd us h a ,-i ng a semi-independent position when they
p rcsen -ed t heir trilJal relations; not as States, not us nations,
not as p ossessed of the full attributes of sover~ignty, but as
a separate people with the pmYer of regulating their internal
and soc:al r elations, and thus far not brought under the la\YS
of the r nion, or of the State within w bose limits they residctl."
'l'rue it is t hat in many adjudications of this court the fact
_bas been fully r ecog nized, thut although possessed of these
att ribu tes of local self governrnent, when exercising their
tribal f unctions, all such rights are subject to the suprem;
legislatiYe authol'ity of tlie United States. Ch erokee JYation v.
Ka.n;:;as Ra£lway Co., 135 U. S. 641, where tbe cases are fully
. re\·iewed. But the existence of the right in Con gress to reg uillte the manner in whiCh tbe local po\Yc·rs of the Cherokee
nation sh all be exercic:ed does not rend er such local powers
:Federal po we1'S a1'jsing from and created by the Constitution
of the '[ nited Stntes. It follo'n that as the powers of locaT
self goY el'JlllJ ent enjoyed uy the Cherokee nation existed prior
to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth
Amendment, which , as we have said, bad for its sole object
to control the powers conferred by the Oonstitntion on the
National Govemment. The fact that the Indian tribes are
subject to the dominant authority of Congress, and that
their po\Yers of local sell government are also opera.tecl upon
and restrained by the general provisions of the Con'stitution
of the United States, compl etely answers the a1·gum ent of
incmwenience which was pressed in the discussion at bar.
Tho claim that the finding of an indictment by a: grand jury
.of less than thirteen violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is conclusively answered by llw·tado
v. Cal-ijoTm~a, 110 U. S. 516,. and NcNulty Y. OalifoTnia, 1±9

.·
.•
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-;_·. S. C-+~·. Tl e 'f'e;:,tion \Yhether a statuto of tLe Cherokee
!-at :,n ·,.1, ;, . ]; \'.;,.s not repugnant t.o t.Le Oom:titut.ion of the
Cnited States or in contlict with any treaty or law of the
enited Shtes had been repealed by another statute of that
nation, and the determination of what \Yas the existing law
of the OlJerokee nation as to the constitution of the grand
jury, were solely matters within the jurisdiction of the courts
of tha.t nation, and the decision of such a question in itself
necessarily involves no infraction of the Constitution of the
Unitetl States. Such has been the decision of this court with
reference to similar contentions arising upon an indictment
and conviction in a state court. In re Dnncan, 139 U. S.
449. Tbe ruling in tlmt case is equally applicable to the contentions in this parLkular arising hom the record before ns.
The counsel for the appellant has Yery properly abandoned
any claim to relief because of alleged errors occurring snbse·
quent to the finding of the indictment. As to the point raiseq
in reference to the date of the commission of the offence as
stated in the i-ndictment, the record as corrected shows that
the error in gnes_tion did not exist. It is, therefore, unneces·
s:try to notice the argument based upon the assumption that
the indictment charged the offence to have been committed
su bsequcnt to the finding of the .true bill.
The judgment :is -·

lUR. J !JcTWE

Affirmed.

.FL~RLAN dissented.

::M:EYER v. RICHARDS.
EJUWR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
EASTli:RN DISTRICT OF I.Ol'ISIAN A.
·No. 39.

Submitted October 25, 1894.- Decid<·d :May

~5,

l89G.

A. , an alien, sold to B. in ~ew Orle11.ns thirteen bonds of the State of Louisiana, defivcred them to him, and receiYcd from !lim }Jayment. for them in
full. Doth parties contemplated thu purcklse :lnd ddinry of ''alid an d
VOL. CLXJ!l-25

.

·.

sovereign powers of the tribes were, and, then, how far and

(

in what respects these powers have been limited.'

'It

must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were
once independent and sovereign nations'

• . • who, though conquered

and dependent, retain those powers of autonomous states that are
neither inconsistent with their status nor expressly terminated
by Congress."
3.

544 F.2d at 1009.
Indian authority as federal authority.
Indian tribunals are not free to violate basic

due process rights, even if they are not held to all the requirements of federal courts.

(See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, supra.}

The application of due process indicates an overriding restriction on tribal "residual authority."
Further, the Ninth Circuit's application of the Tenth
Amendment is instructive:

Indian jurisdiction must be fit in

under either federal or state authority (unless it is construed
to be "retained by the people."}

In McClanahan v. Arizona State

Tax Comm; Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973}, this Court addressed
the source of federal authority over Indian matters:

"[l.] t

is

now generally recognized that the power derives from federal
responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and
for treaty making.
§

2, cl. 2

See U.S. CONST. ART I § 8, cl. 3; AR'I'. II,
II

411 U.S. at 172 n. 7.

That of course, does

not directly address the source of internal tribal authority,
but, in describing the evolution of these concepts, the Court
observed, "the trend has been away from the idea of inherent
Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance
on federal pre-emption."

It is not contested that the Congress

--

could remove all authority from Indian tribunals.

The fact that

i t has not done so could be seen as a kind of negative authority
or tolerance, which would still involve the federal sovereign
sufficiently to warrant the conclusion that the Congress approved
~

(at least tac itly) the prosecution of an individual for violation
"'--'

of tribal law.

Then double jeopardy would be involved if another \

prosecution followed in federal court for the same acts.
The strongsst case for this viewpoint is Keeble v. U.S.,
412 U.S. 205 (1973).

In Keeble, a defendant was held to be

entitled to a "lesser included offense'' instruction in federal
district court even though that lesser offense was exclusively
within tribal jurisdiction.

The Court held that the .Major

Crimes Act required those specified crimes to be tried as though
they had been committed off th€ reservation, and part of that
treatment involved the usual instruction on lesser included
offenses.

The government had argued that such an instruction

would "infringe the tribe's residual jurisdiction," but the
Court was not convinced.

Under the reasoning of Keeble, any Indian

crime could be adjudicated in a federal district court if it
were possibly characterizable as a lesser included offense of
one of the "major crimes" listed in the Major Crimes Act.
· Clearly, that result would not obtain for federal criminal trials
involving lesser, included state crimes.
4.

Recornrnenda tion .:

-

The trend of Keeble and McClanahan is unmistakably
away from former concepts of residual sovereignty.

Nevertheless,

the rules set down in Waller and Grafton for determining identity
of sovereignty refer to the source of authority, the place from
which it originally "sprang."

The Ninth Circuit is divided

\

-

0

- ------------------------~--------------------

within itself on the proper treatment of this question.

I

recommend that this question is deserving of being resolved by
the Court.
B.

Lesser and Included Offense.
There is an accepted test for determining whether

two offenses are sufficiently similar so that sequential
prosecution will constitute a

'--------------

v ~ l :tio~

of double

je~ ardy.

-----------~--------'---,~--~

"If each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the

I

other does not," then the two offenses are sufficiently different.
The test was first expressed in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass.
433, and the Supreme Judicial Court's formulation was explicitly
adopted by this court in Gavieres v. U.S., 220 U.S. 338 (1911).

I

The telling point is whether each offense is found to require

-

a unique element of proof, not whether only one offense has a
unique element.

Gavieres held no double jeopardy for prosecutions

involving "behaving in an indecent manner in a public place" and
"misbehavior addressed to a public official."

It is clearly possible

to commit either one of these without committing the other.

In

Diaz v. U.S., 223 U.S. 442 (1912), a conviction for assault and
battery preceded a conviction for homicide.
facts are quite sui generis:

However, the

the victim had still been living at

the time of the first prosecution, and the second prosecution was
brought upon his death.
Applied to the facts here, the Morey test indicates that

I-

elements of statutory rape included all the elements of contributing

_____.....

to the delinquency of a minor
.... in the manner in which both offenses

were committed.

Although rape required more proof, the events of

the incident required to prove the delinquency charge were also

necessary to prove the rape charge.

The Solicitor's reliance

on Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304 , (1932) (one sale of

-------

morphine violated provisions against selling from package other
than original, and against selling except in pursuance of a
written order) and Henry v. U.S., 215 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1954) ·
(facilitation of transportation of and sale of heroin) is misplaced,
since the events alleged to constitute proof of one crime did
not fit perfectly within the events necessary to prove the other.
The possibility of different offenses is not sufficiently
realistic to allow this Court to avoid the sovereignty issue.
4.
NOTE:

REC0r-1MENDATION:

Cert should be granted.

This case is related to the issue raised in Oliphant v.

~

Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), for which cert. has, in
separate papers, also been requested.
A response has been filed.
8/8/77
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UNITED STATES

v.
Fed/CRIM

WHEELER

Timely/ w. ext.

The Solicitor has filed a supplemental memorandum for
the purpose of bringing to the Court's attention the decision
of the Eighth Circuit in U.S. v. John Walking Crow (Aug. 10, 1977).
The case involved prosecution of an Indian in tribal court for
simple theft, followed by prosecution in federal district court
for robbery under the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.

~~'!'. ~ sU~~ ~

~~ M ~:;/t:f6~~.

~~~~~

This is the same statute that is at issue in United States v.
Wheeler.

The Eighth Circuit found that there was no question

that the two crimes were so related that prosecution for both
of them by the same sovereign would constitute a violation of
the double jeopardy clause.
However, the court held that the Indian Nations are, for

--

purposes of that clause, independent sovereigns from the government
of the United States.

The Eighth Circuit realized that it was

thus in square conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit
in Wheeler, but ruled "we disagree with its holding and decline
to follow it."
The rationale of the Eighth Circuit was that Indian sovereignty
predated federal sovereignty, and has lapsed only to the explicit
extent that the federal government has exerted its authority.
The Supreme Court ruled that a federal court had no jurisdiction
over a murder of an Indian by an Indian in the Dakota Territory
in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).

That case occasioned

the Indian Major Crimes Act, but the Eighth Circuit relies on it
as establishing the independent nature of the Indian sovereignty.
The earlier memorandum recommended that cert. be granted;
the presence of a square conflict between the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits further supports that recommendation.
In this memo, I will also take the opportunity to note that
cert. has been granted in Oliphant v. Suquamish, No. 76-5729,
last June 12.

That case considers whether Indian Tribal courts

have jurisdiction over non-Indians charged with violations of

Indian law while on Indian reservations.

The earlier memorandum

reported that cert. had been applied for in Oliphant . . The briefs
were due on August 30.

This was already an extension, but to

date, no briefs have yet been received.
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No. 76-1629, United States v. Wheeler

This case presents the question whether it
violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment
for resp to be tried in federal court for statutory rape
when he has been tried and convicted of a lesser included
offense by a tribal court.

The parties seem to agree that

the answer depends on whether the source of authority for
the two trials is in the same sovereign, under the
reasoning of Abbate v. United States, 359

u.s.

187.

The

difficulty in the case, as in Oliphant, is in determining
the nature of the tribe's "sovereignty".

\

2•

The most relevant precedents are Abbate, supra,
and several cases involving the relationship between
sovereignties and their instrumentalities:

Grafton v.

United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Waller v. Florida, 397

u.s.

387 (1970); and Puerto Rico v. The Shell Co., 302 U.S.

253 (1937).

In Grafton the Court held that an Army private

could not be tried in a territorial court in the
Philippines after having been acquitted of a lesser
included offense in a court-martial.

The court reasoned:

"If • . . a person be tried for an offense in a tribunal
deriving its jurisdiction and authority from the United
States and is acquitted or convicted, he cannot again be
tried for the same offense in another tribunal deriving its
jurisdiction and authority from the United States."
U.S. at 352.

206

In explaining why the situation of

territorial and military courts differed from the situation
of state and federal courts, the Court said:
"The Government of a State does not derive its
powers from the United States, while the
Government of the Philippines owes its existence
wholly to the United States, and its judicial
tribunals exert all their powers by authority of
the United States. The jurisdiction and authority
of the United States over that territory and its
inhabitants, for all legitimate purposes of
government, is paramount."
Id. at 354 (emphasis supplied).

Waller followed Grafton in

holding that municipalities derive their authority from the
state so that the double jeopardy clause, as applied to the

3.

states, would prohibit trial in a state

co~rt

after

conviction in a municipal court.
The difficulty in applying the principles of the
dual sovereignty exception in the context of an Indian

~•

tribe is that the tribe's status, and its claim to
"severe ignty", is quite ambiguous.

'-'d~~+C ·~,/;;('

As noted in the

Oliphant briefs and bench memo, the Court has adverted to

~

tribal sovereignty on many occasions, but usually this hasz:-'t-lt.(

been in support of some action of the federal

government ~

that singles out Indian tribes, or in opposition to an
assertion of the state's jurisdiction.

The former

~

/~

•

can be

explained in terms of Congress' plenary power to regulate
Indian affairs; the latter in terms of federal preemption
and plenary power over Indians.
The one thing that is clear about tribal
sovereignty is that it is not "full" sovereignty.

~~

It is ~ ~

widely acknowledged that Congress has plenary power to

~

regulate Indian tribes, and this power includes the power
to waive a tribe's sovereign immunity, United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 309 U.S. 506,
512-13; unilaterally to abrogate treaties by statute, Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187

u.s.

553; and to withdraw criminal

or civil jurisdiction from the tribe.

~

In view of the

plenary nature of Congress' control over Indian tribes, it
really cannot be said that tribes are sovereign in the way

4.

that the federal government or the states ,are.

{This is a

slightly different question from the one in Oliphant, where
tribal sovereignty--if recognized at all--is recognized
only because Congress has chosen to let it continue.)
With this in mind, the language in Grafton becomes
relevant.

Although no one contends that the tribes

originally obtained their authority from the federal
government, as the Court described the situation to be in
Grafton, today the tribes' authority exists at the pleasure
of the federal government and according to the vicissitudes
of congressional policy ..

The same is not true of states.

It could be said that the tribes exercise their authority
"by the authority of the United

States"~

and it is clear

that federal authority is paramount to that of the tribe,
and not just in the sense of federal supremacy.

Congress'

power over the tribes is plenary, and whatever sovereignty
the tribes have is "dependent" on the "dominant"
sovereignty of the United States. United States v. United
States Fidelity Co, supra, at 512.
The third case mentioned above, Puerto Rico V. The
Shell Co., involved a prosecution under Puerto Rico's

--=-=

equivalent of the Sherman Act.

One of the claims raised by

the defendant was it might be subjected to double
prosecution, by Puerto Rico and then by the United States.
The Court rejected this contention on the ground that a

5•

second prosecution would be barred by the
clause.

~ouble

jeopardy

Earlier in the opinion, the Court had described

Puerto Rico's powers of self-government and noted that the
purpose of two congressional statutes (the Foraker Act and
the Organic Act)
"was to give Puerto Rico full power of local
self-determination, with an autonomy similar to
that of the states and incorporated territories.
[Citations omitted.] The effect was to confer
upon the territory many of the attributes of
quasi-sovereignty possessed by the states--as, for
example, immunity from suit without their
consent. • . . The power of taxation, the power
to enact and enforce laws, and other
characteristically governmental powers were
vested. And so far as local matters are
concerned, as we have already shown in respect of
the continental territories, legislative powers
were conferred nearly, if not quite, as extensive
as those exercised by the state legislatures."
302

u.s.

at 262.

In spite of all these attributes of

sovereignty, the Court had no trouble concluding that the
principle of Grafton applied because "[b)oth the
territorial and federal laws and the courts, whether
exercising federal or local jurisdiction, are creations
emanating from the same sovereignty.

Resp. concludes from

this that the dual sovereignty exception has been limited
to the state/federal context.
The SG suggests, brief at 31 n. 13, that the
Shell case might be decided differently today, in view of
the fact that Puerto Rico attained "quasi-statehood" in
1952 when Congress "relinquished its control over the

6.

organization of the local affairs of the tsland and granted
Puerto Rico a measure of autonomy comparable to that
possessed by the States", Examining Board of Engineers v.
Flores de Otero, 426

u.s.

572, 597.

The SG says that

resp's use of the Shell case is "misleading" since resp
quotes from Flores in establishing the "quasi-statehood" of
Puerto Rico.

While the SG's point is well-taken with

respect to the degree of independence now recognized in
Puerto Rico, the description in the Shell opinion itself
Puerto Rico's powers of self-government before 1952 made
Puerto Rico sound as at least as sovereign as an Indian
tribe.

~.;r-

4"<...,-f-"'~

~~~c·...u~

Thus the sole - and potentially critical -

-

~

';i.4L.. i...,_

-

distinction between the case of an Indian tribe and the
situations in Grafton, Waller, and Shell, comes down to the
original source of the entity's authority. The present
extent of exercise of sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers
does not differ.

In view of the fact that the nature of

original tribal sovereignty is far from clear, this seems
like a very abstract point on which to rest a decision that
the dual sovereignty exception applies in the case of an
Indian tribe.

The shakiness of this position is aggravated

by the disrepute in which the dual sovereignty exception
has found itself lately.

Since the Court may reconsider

this exception sometime in the future, it would not seem

~

7.

advisable to expand the exception to

appl~

to an entity

whose true sovereignty is questionable and whose lack of
full sovereignty is undisputed.
The only rationale for recognizing the dual
sovereignty exception in this context would be the
government's identification of "undesirable consequences"
that would ensue if double jeopardy were a bar to federal
prosecution in this kind of case.

The government claims

that Congress would ne-put to the choice of foregoing
federal prosecution of individuals tried by a tribal court
(even if the defendant pled guilty in tribal court and
receivedto a relatively minor sentence) or cutting back
the power of tribal courts to try offenders.
This is a legitimate concern.

But if Congress

chose the latter alternative, the result would not be
terribly different from the state of affairs existing today
in the context of major crimes committed by Indians, (the

~jor

{ rimes

~t

does not apply to non-Indians) and in

certain respects, it would be preferable.

As mentioned in

the Oliphant memo, it is an open question--at least in this
Court--whether the Major Crimes Act (18

u.s.c.

§

1153)

provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction or concurrent
tribal and federal jurisdiction over Indians who commit the
enumerated major offenses.

Yet even if tribal courts can

try Indians for major offenses, they can impose

8.

sentences of not more than 6 months imprisonment and/or a
$500 fine.

Part of the reason that an offender can get off

lightly by being tried first in a tribal court is that the
tribal courts are so limited in their sentencing power.
But this is a bad state of affairs even without regard to
the double jeopardy problem.

It would make much more sense

to limit tribal authorities to prosecution for minor
offenses, if their sentencing power is to be so
circumscribed.
Thus Congress could limit tribal jurisdiction to
offenses, enumerated by Congress, that reasonably might be
punished within the sentencing authority now possessed by
the tribes.

Since it seems to be acknowledged that there

is not a great deal of federal interest in prosecuting
minor offenses, a strict separation of the two
jurisdictions (minor offenses in the tribe and major
offenses in the federal government) would make a lot more
sense than the present situation and would not be an
undesirable consequence at all.
Unfortunately, the above solution solves only part
of the problem.

In this case, for example, resp was

charged in tribal court with disorderly conduct and
contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

If the double

jeopardy clause is applicable, the charge on contributing
to the delinquency of a minor would be sufficient to bar

9•

the federal prosecution for statutory rape because it is a
lesser included offense of rape.

Yet there could have been

no federal prosecution for the lesser included offense
alone, cf. Keeble v. United States, 412

u.s.

205; and while

the tribe could have brought the contributing-to-thedelinquency-of-a-minor charge even if the Major Crimes Act
provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over the
enumerated crimes.
Aside from the Major Crimes Act, the other primary
source of federal authority over alleged offenses that take
place on a reservation is 18
crimes provision).

u.s.c.

§

1152 (the interracial

Here there would be significant double

jeopardy problems, if, as we have discussed in Oliphant,
there is concurrent jurisdiction between the tribe and the
federal government.
exception" in
jeopardy.

§

(The supposed "double jeopardy

1152 really does not deal with double

The exception is for "Indians committing any

offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the
local laws of the tribe" (emphasis supplied).

The

exception does not apply when an Indian has been acquitted
by the tribe.)
non-Indians.

In addition, the exception does not mention
There, assuming that

§

1152 provides for

concurrent jurisdiction, the federal government would be
hampered in its prosecution of non-Indians for all criems
(major and minor) under

§

1152 and its prosecutions of

10.

Indians for major and minor crimes, brought under § 1152,
when the defendant had been acquitted by the tribal court.
Assuming arguendo that the federal government is not
greatly concerned with prosecution of minor crimes, and
that Congress could or amend or clarify § 1153 to vest
exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes in the federal
government, I doubt that courts would allow tribes to
prosecute non-Indians for major crimes simply because §1152
jurisdiction is concurrent (if the Court so holds in
Oliphant) .

By implication from the hypothetical amendment

of § 1153 and the limited sentencing power of tribal
courts, tribes could not prosecute non-Indians for major
crimes.

Thus the entire problem probably would come down

to two situations:

potential double prosecution of (i)

4----...J\

non-Indians for minor crimes,A. (Ii ) Indians who had been
acquitted of minor crimes.

Since I have assumed as a

general matter that the federal government is not concerned
about prosecuting the minor offenses, the basic problem
would be the preclusion of federal prosecutions for major
crimes when the defendant had been tried in tribal
a charge that amounts to a lesser included offense of the
federal charge.
This strikes

m~
9fte

as a problem.

It is arguable, as

a policy matter, that both the federal and tribal
governments have an interest in prosecuting an offender

11.
under their respective criminal codes, especially when the
definition of offenses is so different (as in the instant
case) .

But

I

cannot see a real difference between this

situation and the situation in Waller v. Florida, supra.
There the municipality charged the defendant (who allegedly
stole a mural from city hall and paraded it through the
streets) with violation of two of its ordinances:
destruction of city property and disorderly conduct.

After

the defendant was convicted and sentenced to 180 days in
jail, the state charged him with grand larceny (for which
the defendant eventually was sentenced to 6 months to 5
years in jail) .

Of course Waller is distinguishable on the

basic ground that there "the judicial power to try [the
defendant] on the first charges in municipal court springs
from the same organic law that created the state court of
general jurisdiction • • . ", 397 U.S. at 393, the same
policy arguments made the the
Waller.

se

in Wheeler would apply in

Again, the critical question comes down to whether

-

the original source of authority, rather than the present
"
'--"""
s~ ce of that authority, for all practical purposes, is to

'
be determinative. I suppose
it might also be said that tribe members
owe a kind of allegiance to their tribe that does not exist in
other contexts outside of the state or the federal government.
is
In short, this/a very difficult issue aRa whose resolution really
might go either way.
I will address only two of the SG's arguments that this case
falls within an exception to the double jeopardy clause other
suggested
than the dual sovereignty exception. (Three of the other/exceptions--

12.
identified in Jeffers v. United States and described in the
SG's brief at 44-45--simply are not applicable on the facts
of this case.

See resp's brief at 42-44.)

The

t~

other

potential exceptions identified by the SG are (1) WJB's
suggestion in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453 n. 7, that
an exception to the double jeopardy clause may be M "necessary
if no single court had jurisdiction of all the alleged crimes"
and (2) a proposed exception to take account of the unique
federal/Indian relationship.
(1)

I am not sure that WJB's suggested exception would

apply outside of his "same transaction" theory of double
jeopardy.

~XRHXKXXH;xxRHXHX£H~XimRXH8aiBXRRXHXR~~iiea

The

Court has not el articulated such a theory, and such an
exception would have been applicable in Wallr, supra.
municipal and state offenses in Waller were defined

The

x~ea

separately, and neither court had jurisdiction of the offenses
cognizable by the other court.
(2)

This second exception is described by the SG as

applicable in "a middle range of dual-authcrity cases where the
Clause applies in its essentials, but where its impact on prosecution for a greater offense after conviction s for a lesser
included offense is not subject to the analysis of Brown
[v. Ohio].

For the full explanation of the SG's theory, see

its brief at 44-45 n. 26.
work.

I do not think this theory will

The SG suggests this theory for situations where "the

two legislative bodies [are] sufficientjy separate and independent,
and the two statutes which the defendant is accused of vimiating

13.
sufficiently different in the interests they seek to vindicate,
that the approach adopted in Brown v. Ohio for successive prosecutions by 'a State or the Federal Government' may not apply."
Although this is an attractive theory in some respects, it
seems that it would apply equally to the differences between
military and mederal courts, or territorial and federal
courts, or small-town municipal courts and state courts .
If xkaxaixxiR£kiaR Indian tribes are somehow different from
all of these, it would seem better to£.a:i call them "sovereign"
for purposes of the double jeopardy clause, and thereby to
allow multiple prosecutions, than to £X carve out this exception
which sounds like it might also apply to the situations the
Court already has decided trigger the double jeopardy clause.
The only advantage of adopting this theory is that it would
be limited to prosecutions for greater and lesser offenses,
and would not always allow a second prosecution; but I have not
been able to determine the theoretical justification for this
theory.
In short, another difficult question as to which I have no

-

certain answer.

N.B.

-
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CHAMBERS 01'"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 16, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 76-1629, United States v. Wheeler

I tentatively vote to affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. While I believe that tribes retain certain rights of
self-government through a residual sovereignty not deriving
from the federal Constitution but pre-existing it, I do not at
this time think that different sources of sovereignty
necessarily require application of the "dual sovereign"
doctrine of Abbate. What strikes me as peculiar about the
relationship between the tribes and the federal government is
the plenary nature of Congress' authority to act vis-a-vis the
tribes. Unlike the states, whose sovereignty (and concomitant
police power) is protected and recognized in the Constitution,
the tribes continue to possess any criminal jurisdiction at all
wholly at the sufferance of the federal government (absent
limiting treaty language); and Congress has enacted numerous
statutes arguably controlling the tribes' criminal
jurisdiction, 18 u.s.c.
1152, 1153, and the manner in which
such jurisdiction is exercised, 25 u.s.c.
1301 et seq.

For these reasons, I am presently inclined to believe that
the relationship between the tribes and the United States is
more comparable to that of the territories and the United
States, Grafton v. United States, 206 u.s. 333, or
municipalities and states, Waller v. Florida, 397 u.s. 387,
than it is to that of the states and the federal government,
which, as the SG's office has conceded, are the only full
sovereign powers in the United States. My vote is tentative,
however, since the majority opinion in this case or
developments in Oliphant or Santa Clara may persuade me
otherwise.
T.M.

~u.prtmt
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUJST

March 2, 1978

Re:

No. 76-1629 -United States v. Wheeler

Dear Potter:
'··

Please join me.
Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

·.

United States v. Wheeler

'·

~U}lrtnu

(!):curt of tlrt ~ttittb ~hrlts ,
Jfa.sltbtghm. :!B. (!):. 20~'1-~

CHAMBERS OF"

March 4, 1978

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

76-1629 - United States
v. Wheeler

Dear Potter,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

/

~u:pr ~uu>

Cltll1lrl ltf tit~~~ ~hdt$

11frurlfi:ttghnt. !}. <!f. 2!T~'*.;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS
•

I

March 8, 1978

Re:

76-1629 - United States v. Wheeler

Dear Potter:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Btewart
Copies to the Conference

'

···-.:".

'

<qttnrl ttf tltt 'Jltttitth ~fattg
~rullp:ttgf!ttt, 10. ~. 2!lglJ1,~

~npunu

'

'·

CHAMBERS OF

March 8, 1978

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 76-1629 - United States v. Wheeler

Dear Potter:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

~(}~

Mr. Justice Stewart
ccf The Confe renee

..inprtmt <!1ourt ltf tlrt ~lt ~
'~lhts!pnghtn. ~.

<!f.

•

2ll,?~~

CHAMBERS 01'"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

March 14, 1978

Re:

76-1629 - United States v. Wheeler

/

Dear Potter:
I . join.
The Oliphant dissent having persuaded
only one (myself), it is now "gospel," and unless
Thurgood writes as persuasively here as he did(for me)
in Oliphant, I bow to heavier, if not better, "firepower".

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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